

**SELECTION OF CONTRACTORS  
FOR  
SPACE MISSION COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA SERVICES  
SOLICITATION**

I, along with other senior officials from NASA Headquarters met with members of the Source Evaluation Board (SEB) and the Centers to hear their findings based on the evaluation of proposals for the Space Mission Communications and Data Services (SMCDS) solicitation. The findings from SMCDS were presented on a per work package basis at briefings scheduled on different dates.

**PROCUREMENT DESCRIPTION**

The SMCDS solicitation is the follow-on to the Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC) that NASA awarded to Lockheed Martin Space Operations on October 1, 1998. By consolidating many of the agency's communications, flight operations, and data processing space operations functions, CSOC was to eliminate duplication, to streamline processes, and to significantly reduce costs. NASA decided to compete the space operations work rather than exercise the 5-year option of the CSOC because many of the premises on which CSOC was based did not materialize. It should be noted that the CSOC contained both JPL and JSC operational activities that are not included in SMCDS solicitation. SMCDS also includes the former PRISMS activity at MSFC that was not part of CSOC. Additionally, the MSFC requirement for the Huntsville Operations Support Center was not part of the basic period of performance for CSOC; however, this requirement was included in the five-year option in CSOC.

The SMCDS solicitation contains requirements for five separate work packages, which NASA intends to award as individual contracts. Offerors had the ability to propose an agency benefit if they submitted proposals for more than one work package known as a Crosscutting proposal. Crosscutting proposals afford offerors the opportunity to propose a meaningful overall agency benefit similar to those beneficial aspects achieved under CSOC while giving the Centers the flexibility to prepare their own requirements, select the acquisition strategy (including selection criteria), perform the initial evaluation, make award, and manage the contracts. Offerors were permitted to propose on one or more of the work packages; however, the number of Crosscutting proposals offerors could submit was limited by the following formula:

$$(\text{maximum \# of Crosscutting proposals}) = (\text{\# of work packages proposed}) - 1$$

**a. Description of Individual Work Packages:**

- GSFC: Mission Operation & Mission Support (MOMS) Work Package. This work package involves the Mission Operations support of GSFC and other missions. As part of this work package, the contractor could be involved in all



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program phases from concept studies, formulation, development, and operations to decommissioning.

- GSFC: Near Earth Networks Services (NENS) Work Package. This work package involves tracking and data acquisition for near-Earth customer missions. As part of this work package, the contractor will perform customer commitment management; operate and maintain the Ground Network (GN); operate and maintain the Space Network (SN); and perform sustaining engineering, logistics, facilities management, and hardware and software development.
- KSC: Kennedy Integrated Communication Services (KICS) Work Package. This work package involves providing communication services at KSC in support of Space Shuttle Program, International Space Station Program, Payload Carriers Program, Launch Services Program Office payloads, and center wide business engineering logistics, facilities management, hardware and software integration and development for voice, video, and data communication assets under KSC responsibility (i.e., KSC, Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAPS), Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC), Continental United States (CONUS) landing sites, and Trans-Atlantic (TAL) landing sites). (This work package is set aside for small business.)
- MSFC: Unified NASA Information Technology Services (UNITeS) Work Package. This work package provides for the development, implementation, and management of Information Technology (IT) services for the Agency and to MSFC. Support to the Agency includes provision of agency wide information management services such as the NASA Integrated Services Network (NISN), the Integrated Financial Management (IFM) Integration program, Sustaining Engineering Support for Agency-wide Administrative Systems (SESAAS), the NASA ADP Consolidation Center (NACC) and the NASA Computing and Communications Services (NCCS). Support to MSFC includes applications software, computer systems, telecommunications, multi-media, IT security and other miscellaneous IT services.
- MSFC: The Huntsville Operations Support Center (HOSC) Work Package. This work package involves providing voice, video, and data telemetry services in support of simulations, near real-time and real-time flight mission support, which replaces effort performed under the Utilization and Mission Support Contract, and providing support and services to the Data Reduction Center (DRC) which supports MSFC and other NASA Centers for Shuttle, payload, and component test data analysis. (This work package is set aside for small business.)

b. Description of the SMCDS Evaluation Process: The Source Evaluation Board (SEB) at Headquarters evaluated the SMCDS solicitation with the significant input from the Center Work Package Evaluation Teams (WPETs) provided for each work package. The SEB reviewed the Center evaluations for the stand-alone proposals and evaluated the Crosscutting proposals. The SEB also was responsible for the consolidated report of



findings to the SSA regarding award, including award on initial proposals and competitive range determinations.

The WPETs performed the initial evaluation of the proposals in accordance with the evaluation criteria stated in the solicitation for each work package, and, as appropriate, provided input to Headquarters on any Crosscutting proposal affecting its work packages. The Centers had non-voting members on the SEB to participate in SEB discussions to facilitate communications among the WPETs and SEB. The primary responsibility of the WPET representative on the SEB was to amplify and/or clarify the WPET's initial report as necessary. In order to fulfill their responsibilities, the WPET representative members had full access to their WPET deliberations and also were able to participate in all SEB discussions affecting their WPET evaluation.

If a work package was not part of any Crosscut proposal, the evaluation plan stated that the SEB had the ability to take a less active role in the evaluation of proposals and, instead, could operate as an executive advisory/oversight board. The SEB retained the authority to amend any finding made by a WPET; however, the SEB is required to justify and document any such changes. Additionally, the SEB was required to 1) notify a WPET before making any changes to its findings and 2) inform the SSA about any significant disagreement between the WPET and the SEB. A deviation from the requirements of the NASA FAR Supplement was granted on April 11, 2003 to enable the use of this evaluation process for the SMCDS solicitation.

#### c. Source Selection Statement

The source selection statement is drafted in "chapters" to accommodate the fact that there are five work packages in SMCDS as well as Crosscutting proposals that can be awarded on a staggered basis. Section L.2 of the RFP emphasized NASA's desire to award on initial proposals where appropriate, stating that such selections would be made after deciding "(1) such a selection will result in the best value for the Government, based on the specified evaluation; and (2) discussions with other acceptable offerors are not anticipated to change the outcome of the initial evaluation relative to the best value offer(s)."

## Chapter 1

### KICS

#### EVALUATION PROCEDURES

The RFP defined the evaluation factors as Mission Suitability, Past Performance, and Price Reasonableness/Cost Realism. All evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are approximately equal to the cost factor. The past performance factor is less important than the mission suitability factor.

Of these evaluation factors, the RFP provided that only Mission Suitability would be point scored in the evaluation process. In this regard, the RFP defined Mission Suitability as consisting of the following subfactors and assigned points to each as indicated.

Technical Approach	400
Management Approach	500
Safety and Health	<u>100</u>
Total points	1000

Prior to the issuance of the RFP, the WPET had developed detailed evaluation criteria and the numerical scoring system for Mission Suitability as delineated above. In explaining the detailed evaluation procedures, the RFP described the evaluation factors and subfactors, provided the Mission Suitability numerical scoring scheme and specified the criteria to be used in the evaluation.

The RFP provided for the evaluation, but not numerical scoring, of the Past Performance and Cost factors. To assist in evaluating the Past Performance factor, the RFP provided the adjectival ratings of "Excellent," "Very Good," "Good," "Fair," "Poor," or "Neutral" depending upon the assessment of each proposal in this area. Evaluation of proposals under this factor took into consideration the offerors' experience with the technical, schedule, and cost performance of contracts involving programs of a similar nature and magnitude. Regarding the Cost factor, the RFP stated that the adequacy and realism of the cost proposal and the probable cost to be incurred would be evaluated. In addition, the RFP provided for a risk analysis for the Cost factor, which identifies risk areas and the recommended approaches to minimize the impact of those on the overall success of the program. The RFP also provided that a Mission Suitability score adjustment would be made based on any significant difference between the proposed and probable costs.

#### EVALUATION PROCESS



NASA issued the RFP on April 9, 2003 and received five timely proposals by May 27, 2003. The offerors consisted of teams led by the following:

Command Technologies Inc.  
Warrenton, VA

InDyne, Inc.  
McLean, VA

Information Systems Support, Inc.  
Gaithersburg, MD

Innovative Communications Alliance, LLC  
Oviedo, FL

Mettiers Industries, Inc.  
McLean, VA

(None of these offerors submitted a Crosscutting proposal involving the KICS work package.)

The SEB appointed for this procurement used the expertise at the Centers and relied upon the WPET evaluation of the stand-alone proposals submitted for the KICS work package. The final WPET report for KICS was submitted on August 15, 2003 after receiving inputs on a draft from the SEB. There were no disagreements between the WPET for KICS and the SEB on the findings even though the SEB retained the authority to amend any WPET finding.

The WPET applied the established numerical weights and produced a Mission Suitability score within the adjectival rating developed for each proposal. To arrive at the adjectival rating for Past Performance, the WPET relied on the experience identified in each proposal and information obtained on the contacts identified in the proposals as well as data contained in the Past Performance Information Reporting System. Finally, the WPET assessed the probable cost to the Government with a risk assessment of the cost proposed by each offeror. On September 9, 2003, the WPET, with the concurrence of the SEB, presented its initial findings to the SSA.

#### MISSION SUITABILITY EVALUATION

Scoring each subfactor in accordance with the weights delineated in the RFP resulted in the following ranking of the proposals:

1. InDyne, Inc. (IND)
2. Command Technologies Inc. (CTI)
3. Information Systems Support (ISS)
4. Mettiers Industries, Inc. (MET)



### 5. Innovative Communications Alliance, LLC (ICA)

The substance of the SEB's evaluation of Mission Suitability for each proposal follows.

#### IND

The overall adjectival rating for IND was a "Very Good" with the highest Mission Suitability score, having significant strengths in both technical approach and management approach and significant weaknesses in management approach. Except for Safety and Health, in which it earned the second highest score, IND's scores in each of the Mission Suitability subfactors were the highest of any offeror.

The significant strengths included a robust approach to providing a Project Engineering Service Group that uses a consolidated methodology for process and technology enhancement; a sound approach for modernization of KSC communication systems; a strong, realistic response to the KICS scenarios; a superior organizational structure with clear chain of command; an exceptional approach to technology infusion and modernization of KSC's communication systems; a highly effective use of proposed automated KICS Management Integration System to integrate all contract functions; and a superior approach for management of several contract performance indicators. The proposal contained two significant weaknesses in its management approach that included a failure to recognize the 5-year technical and cost plan's primary role for KICS and not being compliant with the Performance Work Statement to implement configuration management using the existing KSC Configuration Management Data System (CMDS).

#### CTI

The overall adjectival rating for the CTI was "Good" with the second highest score for Mission Suitability. CTI's scores in each of the Mission Suitability subfactors were the second highest of any offeror with the exception of Safety and Health where it earned the highest score. CTI had more significant weaknesses than significant strengths in both technical approach and management approach and had a significant strength in the Safety and Health plan.

The significant strengths included their approach for transitioning existing telephone technologies to Voice over Internet Protocol; having a completely integrated customer service approach; proposing development of a Customer Care Network Management Center; and the embedding of safety, health, quality, environmental and reliability in various technical activities that reflects a proactive programmatic approach to the protection of people and property. Significant weaknesses in the technical approach involved a failure to meet the surveillance plan objectives and support requirements for systems supporting major tests; the failure to address photographic post operation critique reports (DRD T-4) and the DoD Multi-Media Performance Production report (DRD T-9); an approach to modernization which increases risk of ineffective and unrealistic solutions to technical modernization objectives; and the failure to provide details necessary to evaluate the offeror's understanding of the requirement to ensure that IT Security would



be implemented and sustained. The significant weaknesses in management approach included the inability to perform the requirements of the solicitation based on the proposed workforce projections since the staffing plan assumed future initiatives would be completed without providing for their implementation; the failure to recognize that Shuttle Processing, External Affairs and DoD Multimedia (among others) as major customers; and the fact that the Chief Technologist Directorate, charged with modernization efforts, consists of only one person.

## ISS

The overall rating for ISS was "Fair" with third highest Mission Suitability score. The ISS scores in each of the Mission Suitability subfactors were the third highest of any offeror with the exception of Management Approach where it received the fourth highest score. The proposal contained several significant weaknesses in technical approach and management approach and one significant strength in management approach.

The significant strength involved having a superior approach to the development of the 5-year Technical and Cost plan. The significant weaknesses included the failure to describe any of the associated roles and responsibilities Qwest would have as a telecom affiliate; the failure to respond to the RFP directions to provide technical details concerning the telephone system; the lack of technical descriptions in areas such as Internet Protocol address database; the lack of sufficient detail in the described approach to training to demonstrate success without Government oversight; the lack of discussion regarding customer support processes for External Affairs, International Space Station, the Launch Support Program Office or Institutional organizational needs; an inefficient implementation regarding the use of its ATOMS system to interface with MAXIMO; and a multitude of concerns with the ISS organizational structure.

## MET

The overall rating for MET was "Fair" with the second lowest score for Mission Suitability. The MET scores in each of the Mission Suitability subfactors were the fourth highest of any offeror with the exception of Management Approach where it received the third highest score and Technical Approach where it received the lowest score. The proposal contained two deficiencies in technical approach and several significant weaknesses in technical approach, management approach, and in the Safety and Health Plan.

The two deficiencies included a failure to provide sufficient detail across the technical subfactor and a failure to provide a technically sound approach for photo services. Significant weaknesses in the proposal involved an ineffective new technology deployment process for modernization of the KICS systems to service-based support; a failure to provide a complete implementation approach for development of the electronic sharing and coordination tools to manage contract functions between KICS and multiple launch site programs, contractors and customers; the failure to provide a consistent accounting of staffing levels throughout the mission suitability and cost volumes; a



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failure to identify key phase-in activities and milestones; a failure to include its Safety & Health Plan into its overall proposal; and a multitude of concerns with MET's organizational structure.

## ICA

The overall rating for ICA was "Poor" with the lowest Mission Suitability score. The ICA scores in each of the Mission Suitability subfactors were the lowest of any offeror with the exception of Technical Approach where it received the fourth highest score. The proposal has two deficiencies, significant weaknesses in technical approach and management approach and two significant strengths in management approach.

The significant strengths involved a superb approach to logistics operations and the use of the Performance Enterprise Resources and Financial Management System. The deficiencies involved the failure to describe numerous technical processes and procedures to meet the requirement of the KICS RFP and the approach and the lack of detail in the draft Safety and Health Plan. The significant weaknesses in technical approach included the failure fully to address the visual imaging and processing sections of the RFP; the failure to provide an in-depth discussion on operational television, public affairs television, broad band communications, and timing and count down; and the failure to adequately describe methodologies and innovations for modernization and future initiatives. The significant weaknesses in the management approach included the failure to recognize the requirement to use CMDS as its configuration management system; the failure to provide an adequate description of the approach to establish, manage, and administer a cost-effective mix of training and the associated Technical Reference Library; the failure to demonstrate the ability to assume contract start responsibilities due to insufficient staffing approach; an inappropriate assignment of organizational elements for work control, photo services and advanced technology organizations; the failure to provide a comprehensive identification/assessment of relevant KICS-related risks associated with contract administration/execution and RFP requirements; the failure to demonstrate how it would meet its stated incumbent hiring goals; and the failure to show how the proposed Technical Advisory Board, telecom affiliate, and KICS organization will work to meet the stated contract goals of infusing advanced technology into KSC.

## PAST PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

In its evaluation of Past Performance, the WPET rated IND as "Very Good" based on its comprehensive relevant experience with contracts similar to the proposed KICS contract. CTI was also rated as "Very Good" based on having past experience to meet most of the requirements in the RFP and the fact the team members had performed at least satisfactorily on current and past work. MET and ICA were rated as "Good" based on experience to meet most of the requirements in the RFP. The WPET noted that the MET and ICA proposals did not clearly demonstrate that neither offerors had the relevant experience to manage a contract the size and complexity of the KICS proposed contract. ISS was rated as "Fair" because, while ISS generally had the experience to meet most KICS requirements, there were some concerns about its performance record.



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Additionally, ISS did not clearly demonstrate experience managing a contract, which was the size or complexity of the proposed KICS contract.

### PRICE EVALUATION

IND had the fourth lowest proposed cost and the second lowest probable cost with the WPET having a moderately high level of confidence in the probable cost. CTI had the second lowest proposed cost and fourth lowest probable cost with the WPET having a moderately high level of confidence in the probable cost. ISS had the third lowest proposed and probable cost; the WPET had a medium level of confidence in this probable cost due to minimal supporting data in the ISS proposal. MET had the highest proposed and probable cost. The WPET had a medium level of confidence in this probable cost due to several inconsistencies and the lack of traceability/reconciliations in the MET proposal. ICA had the lowest proposed and probable cost. The WPET had a moderately low level of confidence in this probable cost because the WPET could not fully assess the cost impact to the technical approach due to a lack of details in the ICA proposal.

The WPET found that all of the proposals contained realistic prices for the work to be performed under KICS after adjusted for probable cost and taking the level of confidence into account. The WPET made a probable cost adjustment of 7.9% for CTI to correct its proposed workforce reduction that erroneously assumed the completion of future initiatives, which also resulted in a 50-point reduction to the Mission Suitability score of CTI.

### DECISION

During the presentation, I carefully considered the detailed findings the WPET presented. I noted the WPET report accompanying the findings further amplified each finding with extensive details. With regard to Mission Suitability, I noted that three of the five offerors received ratings of "Fair" or lower. Even though the RFP provided that "all evaluation factors other than cost or price, when combined, are approximately equal to the cost factor," I determined that these proposals were not competitive with IND which received a Mission Suitability rating of "Very Good" with the second lowest probable cost.

Specifically, based on the number of significant weaknesses in the technical and management subfactors offsetting the one significant strength in management, ISS received a rating of "Fair" in Mission Suitability. More significantly, I did not believe it was possible for ISS to be competitive with IND given the fact that ISS had a higher probable cost.

MET also received a rating of "Fair" based upon two deficiencies in its proposal coupled with several other significant weaknesses and no significant strengths. The deficiencies in the MET proposal were based upon findings by the WPET that a combination of significant weaknesses in the MET proposal increased the risk of unsuccessful contract



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performance. Finally, I noted that IND's probable cost was considerably lower than MBT's probable cost.

Although ICA's proposed and probable cost was significantly less than IND's cost, the WPET had a moderately low level of confidence regarding its probable cost adjustment for the ICA proposal because of the lack of details this proposal contained. More importantly, ICA received a Mission Suitability rating of "Poor" based on two deficiencies, several significant weaknesses and only two significant strengths found in its proposal. The deficiencies in the ICA proposal were based upon findings by the WPET that a combination of significant weaknesses in the proposal increased the risk of unsuccessful contract performance.

Consequently, my primary focus involved two of the five proposals NASA received for KICS - IND and CTI. As stated above, IND received a rating of "Very Good" for Mission Suitability and CTI received a rating of "Good" for Mission Suitability. In examining the Mission Suitability ratings, I noted that by assigning points to its evaluation, the WPET made these ratings even more precise, highlighting the distinctions between IND and CTI and better defining the differences between these two proposals.

The WPET found that IND clearly had the superior proposal with far more significant strengths than any other offeror and the fewest number of significant weaknesses. In its technical approach, IND indicated that it would improve KSC's capability to meet modernization requirements with a consolidated methodology for enhancement and improvement of common processes and technologies across all communication areas. IND also provided a high level of confidence that it understood the KICS requirements and would be able successfully to operate in a complex, dynamic, multi-customer environment. Additionally, IND provided a sound approach for modernization of KSC communications systems to a service based model that included numerous innovations and multiple realistic options for the Operational Intercom system, cable integrity verification systems, Voice over IP communication systems, and Trunked Radio voice recording systems.

With regard to the management subfactor, the WPET determined that IND's superior organizational structure with clear-cut lines of communications would facilitate the accomplishment of KICS' requirements and goals. IND had an exceptional approach to technology infusion and modernization of the KSC's communication systems by staffing its advanced technology group with an affiliate who had expertise in systems based communications and advanced data management systems. Additionally, IND proposed a highly effective use of the automated KICS Management Integration System that would provide for a more efficient financial management system at contract start and had a superior approach for management of several contract performance indicators that would enable effective government insight. The WPET noted that the first significant weakness involved IND's planning for modernization in the 5-year technical and cost plan, but that its technical implementation of modernization resulted in several significant strengths. During the executive session, it was noted that IND received a "Very Good" for both its technical approach and management approach.



I considered the significant strengths in the CTI proposal; however, in contrast with the IND proposal, I was aware that CTI's proposal contained almost twice as many significant weaknesses as significant strengths. The WPET findings for CTI resulted in this proposal receiving a "Fair" for its technical approach and a "Very Good" for its management approach. In its technical approach, the WPET found that CTI failed to meet certain requirements in the RFP. For example, the RFP required resolution of high priority problems on a 24-hour/7 day basis, but CTI proposed trouble ticket resolution during normal office hours only. CTI also failed to address photographic post operation critique and the DoD Multi-Media Performance Production reports. Furthermore, the WPET found that CTI's approach to modernization increased risk by proposing ineffective and unrealistic solutions to modernization objectives. The other significant weakness in CTI's technical approach was that it lacked sufficient data to evaluate whether CTI understood the requirement to ensure IT security.

There also were a number of significant weaknesses associated with CTI's management approach. CTI proposed having only one person staff the directorate in charge of modernization; however, the WPET did not believe that one person was adequate to meet the requirements of RFP and the modernization goals of KICS. The CTI proposal also failed to recognize many of the major customers of KICS such as Shuttle Processing and ELV. The most serious weaknesses in the CTI management approach involved an unrealistic workforce reduction. CTI proposed this reduction based upon an improper assumption that the modernization initiatives it proposed would be completed early. During the presentation, the WPET stated that KSC did not have the money in its budget to support CTI's proposed initiatives for modernization.

In making this decision, I also focused on the relative cost positions of IND and CTI. In this regard, I noted that the WPET reduced the CTI score for Mission Suitability by 50 points to reflect a 7.9% adjustment for probable cost. I examined whether the WPET's adjustment for probable cost to CTI's proposed cost was valid. Most of the WPET's adjustment to CTI's proposed cost was for a staffing adjustment. CTI had proposed a significant decline in workforce based upon the assumption that KSC would implement all of the CTI recommendations for modernization - modernization initiatives that would be implemented through the ID/IQ portion of the contract. As stated above, KSC informed me that it did not have a plan or separate funding to support CTI's proposed initiatives for modernization and, therefore, I found that the probable cost adjustments to CTI's proposal were valid.

Additionally, I observed that IND's probable cost was substantially lower than CTI's probable cost. The WPET had a moderately high level of confidence in its probable cost adjustments to both the IND and CTI proposals. Further, I was aware that the WPET had prepared an extensive cost report detailing each probable cost adjustment made. I knew that CTI had earned a "Fair" for technical whereas IND earned over a "Very Good" for this subfactor. Although IND's proposal also contained two significant weaknesses, as discussed below, I determined that IND could correct these weaknesses through the review of data deliverables - something that should not involve an increase to the



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probable cost of IND. In contrast, I did not believe CTI was capable of correcting the remaining weaknesses in its proposal without having a concomitant increase to cost. For example, the probable cost adjustment only addressed the weakness involving CTI's proposed reduction in workforce, but it did not address such weaknesses as resolving high priority items on a 24/7 basis or addressed the requirement to provide photographic post operations reports.

Based on the magnitude of the difference between IND and CTI, I did not believe that discussions with CTI would change the outcome of the initial evaluation. It did not appear that CTI could submit a proposal superior to the one IND had submitted without also increasing its probable costs to NASA since CTI had the lower technical, higher priced proposal. I believe this decision is consistent with Section L.2 of the RFP which provides that NASA intended to award on the basis of initial offers if "(1) such a selection will result in the best value for the Government, based on the specified evaluation; and (2) discussions with other acceptable offerors are not anticipated to change the outcome of the initial evaluation relative to the best value offer(s)."

After determining that CTI should not be included in the competitive range, I had to decide whether NASA should award to IND based on initial proposals or should have a competitive range of one. I was concerned about the significant weaknesses the WPET found in the IND proposal and would not consider awarding on initial offers unless processes existed by which these weaknesses could be fixed easily. A determination to have a competitive range of one would afford NASA the opportunity to resolve these weaknesses, but would take additional time and would delay the ultimate award.

I needed to examine the nature of the significant weaknesses found in IND's proposal in order to determine which approach was most advantageous to NASA. The first significant weakness involved IND's failure fully to recognize the 5-year Technical and Cost Plan's primary role in managing the program customer requirements of Shuttle, Station, ELV, and DoD for operations and maintenance, sustaining engineering, and aging infrastructure equipment replacement. As discussed above, the WPET found that IND had a very strong technical approach to modernization and IND's weakness was limited to planning.

The requirement for the 5-year plan is described in Data Requirement Description (DRD) M-2 of the RFP. This DRD directs the contractor to make the initial submission by July 20, 2004 or 30 days prior to the POP submit. DRD M-2 also directs the contractor to make the submission on an annual basis or "as required." Given the requirements in DRD M-2, the WPET was confident the contract gave the parties sufficient time to resolve the issue involving the 5-year plan during the Post Award conference and/or during subsequent meetings with IND. Additionally, the WPET did not believe this would result in an increase to IND's probable cost.

IND's second significant weakness involved its noncompliance with the requirement to use the existing KSC CMDS for configuration management - a requirement found in the PWS and described in DRD M-3. IND, therefore, would not be able to migrate all




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configuration management data records into their proprietary Program Information and Management System as it proposed. DRD M-3 directs the contractor to make the initial submission of this data deliverable within three months after contract award and requires subsequent submissions on an annual basis with updates "as required." Again, the WPET was confident that the contract contained adequate procedures to correct this weakness in the Post Award Conference and/or in subsequent meetings with IND, particularly those meetings held during the phase-in period of the contract. Moreover, the WPET did not believe the use of CMDS would result in an increase to IND's probable cost since IND was capturing 95% of the incumbent workforce, was familiar with CMDS, and would not need to be retrained on CMDS.

Consequently, I selected IND for award since it offers the best value to NASA by having the highest technical proposal and by having the lowest probable cost among all of the offerors with a Mission Suitability rating of "Fair" or higher. Moreover, I concluded that it would be most advantageous to NASA to make award based on initial offers since I am confident that IND can successfully and effectively perform all the tasks required by the KICS solicitation at a fair and reasonable price, and that the contract contains sufficient procedures whereby the parties can readily resolve the two significant weaknesses in the IND proposal prior to full contract performance.

  
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Date